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With hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants taking the streets of Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and other large American cities, the United States suddenly woke up to the 
phenomenon of illegal migration. Suddenly, this population of the shadow came 
under the spotlight of the media. Suddenly, the one-day strikes and the shutting down 
of many shops in sign of protest –and solidarity- rendered visible the significance of 
the illegal workforce's contribution to the national economy. The issue of the 
integration, or not, of these disenfranchised people to the US citizenry was raised 
again. 
 
What, in the aftermath of the event, appeared clearly is that though economically 
interdependent, the international system of territorial states and boundaries presents 
decreasingly porous borders. The best illustration was given by President Bush's 
decision to reinforce the number of mobile control patrols operating along the border 
with Mexico.  
Since differentials in wealth are one of the givens of the international system based on 
sovereign states, migrations are a structural feature of the world order. Parallel to this 
phenomenon, ways and means to regulate people's movements have been developed. 
Systems of identification aimed at distinguishing citizens from non-citizens along 
with techniques to monitor cross-border movements have been elaborated and made, 
over time, more and more sophisticated. For nation-states are not only territorial but 
also membership organisations. In the course of the past centuries, states have 
established the exclusive right to authorize and regulate the movement of people or to 
put it like John Torpey,  
"states have successfully usurped from rival claimants such as churches and 
private enterprises the 'monopoly of the legitimate means of movement'- that 
is their development as states has depended on effectively distinguishing 
between citizens/subjects and possible interlopers, and regulating movements 
of each"
i
. 
 
In the light of this theoretical statement, the case of the Gulf countries is both peculiar 
and enlightening. In this article, it will be argued that in this region of the world, the 
necessity to control significant tides of migrations preceded the official establishment 
of definitive borders and state structures. This very sequencing, compounded with the 
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issue of oil revenues' distribution, affected the forms of movement control that were 
opted for, as well as the types of nationality issues that derived from it. These 
questions would be addressed by referring, mostly but not exclusively, to the 
situations in Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 
Movement control in the wake of oil revenues in the pre-
independence period 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, windfalls coming from oil discovery started 
to accrue to the ruling sheikhs of the little political entities that the British had chosen 
earlier as interlocutors. The Gulf region found itself in an economically privileged 
position compared to the Persian, Indian and Levantine neighbouring areas, they used 
to trade with. In the face of the scarcity and lack of qualification of local labour force, 
hitherto composed mainly of seamen, craftsmen and semi-Bedouins, the oil 
companies hired foreigners. Migrants started to flock first to Bahrain where oil export 
began as early as in 1934, then Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and to what would become the 
United Arab Emirates where oil was not discovered before the late 1960's. 
 
At first, the British Foreign Office was in charge of the foreign policy of the coastal 
sheikhdoms Britain signed protectorate treaties with. It was especially responsible for 
defining the migration policy and delivering the entry visas. As such the Foreign 
Office could easily monitor and regulate the stay in Kuwait of British and European 
travellers
ii
. Yet, in a context of inexistent border posts on the ground and traditional 
seasonal migrations (due to whether pastoral or pearl diving activities), this control 
was rather minimal and boiled down to a selective, if not in certain cases 
discriminatory, employment in the oil industry. In Bahrain, for instance, as early as 
the first half of the 1930s the local sheikhs requested the British Political Agent on the 
island to discourage the oil companies from hiring qualified Iranian labour, for fear of 
the Iranian claims over the island. As a matter of fact, Bahrain had been included 
within former Iranian empires and the ruling family, Al-Khalifa, originally from the 
heart of the Arabian Peninsula, have always viewed the ambitions of their large 
neighbour with outmost suspicion. If the British were pleased to replace Iranian 
workers by Indians from their further south colonies, the implementation of such rules 
as the interdiction for Iranian to stay in Bahrain after the end of their work contract 
proved to be difficult in a society lacking administrative structures and documentary 
records.  
 
Moreover, in most of the Gulf countries, border posts, if not land borders themselves, 
were inexistent. Even when some kind of boundaries was established under the aegis 
of the British –who showed a rather scant attention for the inland desert territories-, 
they remained completely open due to the age-old nomadic traditions of the Bedouin 
tribes. The first attempts by the nascent states to control border crossings took the 
shape of hindering the freedom of tribal movements. After the Uqayr treaty (1921) 
that delineated the borders between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the rise and 
dominance of Saudi and Iraqi state power over the desert and steppes they controlled 
led to the constant harassment, attacks and pillages of the nomadic tribes
iii
.The Saudi 
blockade of overland trade with Kuwait (1921) and Iraq‟s aggressive “anti-
smuggling” measures (1932), that were employed to express political domination in 
the desert of Kuwait and beyond in the guise of trade control, altered, curtailed and 
criminalised as „smuggling‟ the age-old patterns of trade between the settled and the 
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nomadic populations. As a result, innocent Bedouins were the victims of the nascent 
states‟ rivalry. Seasonal migrations were discouraged and trade control instituted at 
the entrance of main market cities. Hence the first border post in Kuwait was located 
in Jahra in the outskirt of the city-port but miles away from what Uqayr treaty defined 
as national territorial boundaries. 
 
Nationality Laws and Migrations policy 
 
At the time when the British carved up state entities on the Persian Gulf coast along 
the lines of the sheikhdoms they used to deal with before, and, subsequently, granted 
the small Gulf countries
iv
 their independence, the issue of mass migration was already 
a prominent one. Confronted with significant cross-border movement before 
institutions that characterise territorial states were even set up, these new countries 
came up, when they started to develop their own administrative structures, with their 
own and original solutions with regard to the centralised authorisation-regulation of 
people's movement. 
 
The question of the delineation between citizens and non-citizens has been crucial: the 
criteria to obtain nationality were very stringent and all the more so as entries into 
what would become national territories were unhindered. Among others, tough 
nationality laws played the role of a retroactive control over movements of aliens. The 
Kuwaiti example is interesting as two different nationality laws were adopted within 
ten years, the second nullifying the first one. The first nationality law was adopted 
under the British protectorate in 1948, at a time when nationality was not yet an issue 
and people were still using the age-old custom of classifying self and others according 
to their birthplaces and not to the formal allegiance to a state. In 1948, the decrees on 
citizenship stated: “Kuwaiti subjects were ruling family members, those permanently 
residing in Kuwait since 1899, children of Kuwaiti men and, at that time, children of 
Arab or Muslim fathers also born in Kuwait. Naturalization was possible after ten 
years in Kuwait with work and Arabic proficiency and by special order for valuable 
services”v. The Law No 15 of December 14, 1959 –two years before independence 
and - reverted the 1948 inclusion as Kuwaitis of those entitled jure soli and changed 
the benchmark date used to distinguish the „original Kuwaitis‟ as opposed to 
naturalised ones, to 1920. It also made naturalisation, limited to fifty persons a year, 
more difficult, and many amendments further toughened naturalisation requirements. 
If the reasons behind the change are not clear, the trend is obvious: confronted with a 
de facto large presence of migrants, the nascent state appropriates itself the means of 
monitoring the population within the reach of its territorial control by distinguishing 
in situ between nationals and aliens. 
 
In most of the Gulf countries, the same pattern of nationality law applies, with the 
determining of a symbolic benchmark date since when inhabitants of the city-states 
had to prove their residence, as a sign of their loyalty to the sheikhdom. The absence 
of documentary records, the fears of letting opportunists and tricksters in, and in the 
case of Kuwait and Bahrain, the threat represented by sovereignty claims respectively 
from Iraq (1961) and Iran (1970) resulted in a certain wariness with regard to 
nationality granting. This wariness turned into a real reluctance to naturalise, as the 
development of the welfare state system linked the status as a „national‟ with 
significant material benefits. Naturalisation process was obstructed in practice, if not 
in the legal texts themselves, as decisions in the matter of citizenship were and still 
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are regarded as discretionary. This quasi-absence of naturalisation, together with a 
structural need for labour import, led to the widely acknowledged fact that citizens of 
certain Gulf countries are a minority in their own country. Nowadays expatriate 
workers make up more than 50% of the total population in Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE 
and more than 25% of the population of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman. The 
control of the presence and movement of the overwhelming foreigners' majority lies 
on two main foundations: the preference for non-Arab, short-term workers and the 
sponsorship system. The issue of migrants' integration into society is rather posed in 
terms of segregation between nationals and aliens within the country.  
 
Historic Overview of the Politics of migrant Labour 
 
First, most of the Gulf States have implemented policies of labour import that aimed 
at preventing migrants from staying on their territories and especially from asking for 
more rights, including that of being naturalised, nationality representing the 'right to 
have rights'
vi
. In Kuwait, the evolution of the politics of migrant labour illustrates this 
double goal.  
In the pre-independence period, the first tide of migration was made mostly of Arabs 
from Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, whose qualifications and fluency in Arabic 
offset the lack of education of the local population. The second wave of migration 
consisted in the bringing in Kuwait of the families of the hitherto single male Arab 
migrants from the first tide. The commercial elite associated with the rulers was 
pleased with this option as it significantly enlarged the size of the consumers' market 
(real estate, goods consumption) upon which their wealth depended and still does. Yet 
the presence of this migrant population, in the process of getting permanently settled, 
posed a threat to the fragile equilibrium of the Kuwait society in the eyes of the 
Kuwaiti government. In addition to the growing imbalance between citizen and non 
citizen, these populations, spread new ideologies, such as nasserism or baathissm, 
which the conservative regime did not see favourably.  
As a consequence, the government opted for a new labour policy: people, with no 
knowledge of Arabic, were hired from Asia to work on the then mushrooming 
development projects (infrastructure, building). Like for the other migrants, their 
residency permit and thus their stay in Kuwait was linked to their work contract but 
the latter was deliberately meant to be limited in time as projects were temporary. 
This policy of Asian labour import that prevents the formation of any deep-rooted 
relations between nationals and expatriates and discourages any hope or even desire 
on the part of the migrants to permanently settle still prevails today across the Gulf 
countries. Although work contract can be renewed and the stay in the host countries 
prolonged for years, any migrant, however long his employment, will eventually have 
to leave the Gulf upon expiry of his work contract.  
 
The Sponsorship or (Kafala) System 
 
The other key of the entry monitoring, daily administration and control of the vast 
migrant population is the sponsorship system, in Arabic Kafala
vii
, which consists in a 
partial privatisation of the control over foreigners. In the Western states' model of 
migration control the state has gradually expropriated from individuals and private 
entities the legitimate 'means of movement' across and inside boundaries. In the Gulf 
States, though the state remains the ultimate authority for issuing entry visas and 
residency permits, it has delegated some of its control functions to its own citizens.  
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Apart from the tourist visas granted to nationals of some Western countries and 
lasting from a fortnight (Kuwait, Bahrain) to one (Oman) to three months (Dubai)
viii
, 
any foreigner permanently living in the Gulf countries has to be under the 
responsibility of a GCC national or institution, called sponsor or kafeel. This sponsor 
is also the expatriate's employer, who will get the entry visa and residency permit 
done. He is legally and economically responsible for his employee, has to provide 
him/her with a flight ticket back upon termination of the contract and must inform the 
government authorities of any change occurring in the work contract (renewal, 
cancellation, expiry). No job change is allowed without prior consent of the sponsor. 
Moreover, though not required by the law, the practice of confiscating the foreigner's 
passport upon his/her arrival is widespread in the Gulf countries. This practice, 
according to Longva is regarded as an 'effective crime-prevention measure, since 
those who have committed an infraction will not be able to leave the country and 
escape prosecution'
ix
. It is seen particularly favourably by GCC nationals as foreign 
labourers do work in the intimacy of their homes, as cook, nanny etc.  
As a result, the sponsorship renders the presence of the worker in the host country 
entirely dependant on the sponsor's will and satisfaction with his/her employee -even 
though, the power of the sponsor varies across countries, being tremendous in Kuwait, 
Qatar and the UAE where the demographic imbalances between natives and 
expatriates is more pronounced, and lesser in Bahrain and Oman where the 
participation of indigenous worker to the economy is higher. In the case of a labour 
conflict, though, the worker has only two options: either the sponsor accepts to 
terminate the contract and the worker would shorten his/her stay and pay for his/her 
return, or the worker runs away usually seeking shelter in his/her own embassy. The 
embassy will then try to negotiate the terms of the contract termination and facilitate 
the return trip.  
 
A few runaways may not wish to come back to their home countries. They then 
remain as illegal aliens. Like anywhere else in the world, and as exemplified by the 
US case, low-paid jobs are always available, despite the firm interdiction to hire 
illegal migrants, for disposable workers who enjoy no actual rights in the country. 
This people will stay in the country as long as they are not caught by the police, the 
probability of which is rather low, and until they benefit from a general amnesty 
declared by interior ministries of the GCC countries, every four or five years. 
According to the terms of these amnesty decrees, illegal workers can freely report to 
their embassies in order to obtain travel documents and a lawful exit visa.  
 
The combination of the three factors, obstruction of the naturalization process, import 
of preferably short to medium-term Asian labour and the sponsorship system, added 
to the closure of borders reduces significantly the issue of illegal migration 
particularly acute in the cases of massive labour-importing countries. Efficient though 
as the system of non-integration, structural dependence upon the kafeel and 
circumscribed freedom may seem, whole categories of socially accepted illegality 
remain nevertheless in all the GCC countries. 
 
Illegal Fringes  
 
More than properly illegal, these populations found and for some of them still find 
themselves in a legal no-man's-land. This legal void takes the shape of statelessness 
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and results from the establishment of nation-states and the centralisation in their hands 
of the monopoly of legitimate means of movement.  
 
When the Gulf States became independent, the regime of free movements, comings 
and goings across the Persian Gulf or the North-Arabian desert, had been replaced by 
a system of regulated migrations where modern states use legal tools of control, such 
as nationality, visas and residency permits. All these means of migration‟s control are 
sovereign attributes of the modern state, as a creator of the national identity as much 
as a major actor in the national economy. As a consequence, the population that found 
themselves in an in-between situation have been victims of their having no territorial 
anchor. This concerns two types of stateless people.  
 
The first one is the Bedouin category; they represent the indigenous part of the 
stateless people. They are the ones whose tribal traditional territory stretched over 
different states (Shammar, Murrah) and found themselves on the wrong side of the 
border at the crucial time of nationality granting. As a result, they were suspected not 
to be loyal enough to the ruling sheikhs For instance, the young state of Kuwait 
initially played a significant part in generating this kind of situations: it first permitted 
and facilitated the survival of the nomadic tradition by leaving its borders open to 
their seasonal migrations. The provisions of the 1959 Aliens‟ Residence Law did not 
apply to “tribal members entering Kuwait by land from places where they used to do 
so for the purpose of performing their ordinary business”x. When the tide of 
sedentarisation affected the desert tribes in the 1960s, the Kuwaiti state allowed them 
to settle on its territory but did not formally grant them the status of citizens. In return, 
they provided the rank and file of the Kuwaiti police and army, under the supervision 
of officers who were Kuwaiti nationals. 
 
The second, sometimes overlapping, category is made of individuals with Iraqi (in 
Kuwait) or Iranian (rest of the Gulf) connections. Because of Iraq's territorial claim on 
its small neighbour, Kuwaitis have always feared that Iraqi workers may outnumber 
them and request to be annexed to Iraq. The Iranian immigration to the Gulf dates 
back in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century, when rich merchants from 
Khuzistan, Arabistan settled in Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain. If those long-settled Persian 
migrants have usually been naturalised, such has not been the case of all descendants 
from immigrants who came to the Gulf later on in the twentieth century. Because of 
the Shah's ambitions to stretch his power over to the Gulf, temporary workers from 
Iran, especially those hoping they will eventually be back to their home country
xi
, 
rendered themselves suspicious of keeping links with the larger neighbours regarded 
as a threat and did not obtain citizenship upon the Gulf' States' independence. Until 
now, most of them, who have lost any tie with Iran including Persian's speaking, are 
in a rather undefined legal situation. This 'semi-legality'
xii
 is economically 
advantageous for states that condone it: it keeps this disenfranchised people working 
for lesser often daily-paid salaries with precarious job contracts and provides a useful 
economic buffer, as they can be sacked at any time, in extremely segmented and rigid 
Gulf labour markets. 
 
This leads to a last category of people, who enjoy no actual rights in the Gulf 
countries where they live, and -most probably- no more rights in the countries they 
originally come from due to the type of employment they got. These are the foreign 
workers from the Indian subcontinent, most of them Balouchis, who served for two, 
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three, sometimes four generations in the police forces and army of the Gulf States, 
developing modern states structures.  
 
In the Gulf countries like in any modern territorial state, the nascent states have, upon 
independence, centralised the means of movement control, and had the system of 
border monitoring and the principle of settled population prevail over the tribal 
nomadic traditions and the economic-driven seasonal migration across the Gulf. 
National identification came to replace the existing form of traditional identification 
that is membership of a tribe, place of origin or professional activity.  
In a context of mass migration due to the discovery of oil, three tools have been 
jointly used to keep migrant workers needed by the booming oil and consumption 
economy away from the citizenship and the citizenry. First very stringent 
naturalisation criteria, preventing indigenous population from being outnumbered by 
recent migrants, contributed to strengthen the national sovereignty on territories 
claimed by neighbours or ideologies (pan Arabism). From the practice of highly 
selective naturalisation derives the fact that GCC nationals, with low levels of 
working efficiency, are or tend to structurally be a minority within their own 
territories. To 'keep migrant workers in check'
xiii
, migration policies favouring 
temporary Asian labour have been set up along with the involvement of nationals into 
the migrants' control (the Kafala system). This extremely tight control over aliens, 
whose pervasive presence makes nationals feel they are 'under siege', has reduced to a 
great extent illegal migration but it has not eradicated the shadowy areas where the 
laws do not reach.  
Two processes have been at work: on the one hand, people, who came at a time when 
there were no borders, have been left without national identification because their 
origin, tribal, Iraqi or Iranian, made their loyalty suspicious. On the other hand, 
foreign people have been brought in to perform for generations the -low-levels- 
security tasks (police, army) that fall upon any independent territorial state. In 
Bahrain, where the government embarked on a policy of naturalisation of both the 
stateless of Iranian descent and of the security forces, the opposition denounced a 
political manoeuvre to revert the sectarian balance hitherto in favour of the Shia. 
Without entering into the details of the debate, a point is worth noting: in spite of the 
claim made by the Bahraini Shiite opposition that the government speeded up the 
import of Sunni security personnel, the number of people enjoying no clear status and 
therefore no actual rights is not insignificant. If they were to be in the limelight, as 
illegal migrants suddenly were in the US, it might prove to be so in most of the GCC 
countries. 
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